Interview with Edward C. Ingraham

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

EDWARD C. INGRAHAM

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: Today is April 8, 1991 and this is an interview with Edward C. Ingraham on his career on behalf of The Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy.

I wonder if you could give me a little about your background— where you came from, your education, etc.?

INGRAHAM: I was born in Mineola, New York, out on Long Island. I have never been to Mineola since, as far as I know. I grew up half in upstate New York in a small town and half in southern California. One grandparent group was upstate New York my home. Went to Dartmouth from New York, class of 1943. We all graduated early, just in time to get into the Army in World War II, European theater. I was a weather observer...

Q: Where did you serve?

INGRAHAM: England, France, Belgium and Germany.

...reading thermometers and trying to tell the Air Force when they could fly. While I was in the Army I saw an article in the Stars and Stripes about the Foreign Service examination.

Q: The Stars and Stripes being the military newspaper.

INGRAHAM: Yes. I thought, “Ah ha, here is a chance to get out of the Army quick.” This was right after the end of the war. So I signed up to take the exam. About two days later we were told that we were going home, so I didn't take it, but it was in my mind.

I got to New York, went down to the city and got a job. I saw another article in the paper about Foreign Service exam, and took it late in 1946 and came into the Service in 1947.

Q: You graduated from Dartmouth before you went into the Army?

INGRAHAM: Yes. They speeded us up, getting us through in three and a half years rather than four.

Q: You went into the Foreign Service in 1947. Was there a training course that brought young officers together at that time?

INGRAHAM: Yes, there was. It was about a three-month course that was supposed to teach you everything—consular, administrative, political, economic, where the world is going, what an allowance is, how you make out an expense account, etc. I took the course in the summer and early fall of 1947. Living in New York, I had just gotten married. I would go down to Washington every Sunday night on the train (round trip was $15 in those days) and then every Friday night I would ride back up to New York. This went on for three to four months.

Q: Could you characterize your class—where did you come from, how did you see the world and the United States' role in it?

INGRAHAM: It was a varied class; we came from everywhere. The only thing we all had in common was that we had all been in World War II. So we all had something to talk about

and relate to. Of the ones I knew best who came in with me, one was a Marine lieutenant in the Pacific, another had been flying in the Air Force, etc.

Q: I remember when I came in I discovered in my basic officer course one of the young men had been an officer in my outfit in Japan and had been on my promotion panel getting me up to airman first class.

How did you see America's role in the world in 1947?

INGRAHAM: I think we saw it quite righteously. We were beginning to get a little more sophisticated, but it seemed to me that in my class we were convinced we were the good guys. We had won the war, it is too bad about the Russians, we thought everything was going to be fine, we thought the little triumvirate or the big triumvirate of Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, or Truman, Churchill, Stalin, or Truman, Attlee, Stalin was going to run the world. All of the sudden the Russians turned out to be the bad guys. I think we had a rather simplistic view of the world at that time. Not inaccurate, just simplistic and naive.

Q: Did you consider yourself going out to do a job or as missionaries?

INGRAHAM: A little bit of both, I think. First of all it was a job which sounded more interesting than the one I had had on Wall Street for less than a year. Of course, if I had stayed on Wall Street for 20-30 years I might have ended up with $20 million, but at the end of 35 years I would probably have gone to jail like the rest. Coming out of the Army you are used to moving around and you know there are horizons over there and want to see what they are. It sounded like an ideal job.

Q: Your first post was Bolivia and you were there for about two and a half years. Where did you go and what were you doing?

INGRAHAM: I was sent down to Cochabamba, Bolivia. This was my first post and it was a one-man consulate. It wasn't as ridiculous as it may seem because there wasn't

much going on in Cochabamba and there wasn't much reason to have a consulate there. We opened the consulate in the latter days of World War II to keep an eye on what the Neo-Nazis were doing in Bolivia and also to support rubber-collecting operations in the lowlands of eastern Bolivia.

It was a delightful city then. I visited the place again in 1986 and it has quintupled in size and lost all its charm. It is a very sad city now.

Anyway, I had been down there about a year when somebody in Washington asked why we had a post there. The question was sent down to me and I couldn't answer it. The Embassy in La Paz couldn't say why we had a post in Cochabamba either, so the Department closed it.

Q: You then went to our Embassy in La Paz. What was the political situation like in Bolivia when you were there?

INGRAHAM: I learned my first lesson about the real world and...actually in retrospect after I left Bolivia, I realized that we had been in a sort of dream world. By “we” I mean the American Embassy in La Paz. I was a political officer. It was rather an informal arrangement. The Ambassador, a fine old man, Joe Flack, was an old European hand (his wife was Viennese) and to him it was like being sent out to be Ambassador to Afghanistan or some such place.

After the overthrow of Villaroel in 1946, there was in Bolivia what you could call a democracy. There were free elections and presidents who were elected. We thought we were watching democracy in action. What we were watching and none of us realized it... I don't blame myself for this, but the older ones there, the DCM, etc., who were either South America or Europe oriented...but only after I left Bolivia did I realize we had been looking at a world that wasn't quite the real world. After an election, for example, I sent in a despatch giving the election returns and our commentary, which was rather elegant but an Alice in Wonderland commentary because only about one of ten Bolivians voted. The

voters were white with Spanish background. The ones who didn't vote were the Indians who made up the majority of the country. They had no part in the life of the country; they were exploited.

A few years later, I think about 1952, there was a big explosion. We had a military mission in Cochabamba to train the Bolivian Army—that was the main reason for keeping a consulate in Cochabamba after World War II. There were five or six rather pleasant American Army officers there, trying to teach the Bolivian Army how to fight, carry guns and march. That army was wiped out totally in 1952.

It was only after I left Bolivia that I realized we really hadn't been in the real world. We weren't reporting on Bolivia, the real society of the nation. We were reporting about this little upper crust of people who ran the country. It wasn't a dictatorship. It was relatively benign, but it wasn't the real world.

Q: It wasn't of the tin miners, unions, etc.

INGRAHAM: They were there.

Q: But they weren't making themselves felt at that time?

INGRAHAM: Oh yes they were. They were making themselves felt to the elite, who saw them as animals down below, growling. There was a certain amount of uneasiness.

A number of Americans worked in the tin mines. I can remember an outburst in one of the mines, Catavi, when several Americans were grabbed by the miners, sticks of dynamite placed on their chests and then blown up. We managed to get the survivors and their families out by plane. Our air attach flew down and managed to snag them out as the miners chased them across the field. It was rather dramatic. We had one rescued wife and a couple of children stay with us.

But none of us at the Embassy seemed to realize what it really meant: that here was a country seething. Instead, we were following the intricate interplay of politics among the little group at the top.

Q: This, I suppose, was almost endemic to diplomats within much of Latin America at the time, wasn't it?

INGRAHAM: I guess it was. I was trying to recall whether any of us knew better. I can't think of anyone. The only one who might have known better was another junior officer who married a Bolivian girl—fellow named Sam Eaton who ended up as Ambassador to Colombia. I think he was beginning to realize what was really going on in Bolivia. Basically the rest of us didn't. Of course, Bolivia was not the country that attracted the best and brightest among the senior officers.

Q: I suppose about that time our major concern was Argentina, with Peron and the aftermath?

INGRAHAM: Yes, it was.

Q: Moving on, you were transferred to Hong Kong in 1950.

INGRAHAM: Yes, 1950 to Hong Kong. In those days—I wonder if you can still do it?—you were able to specify three choices for your next post.

Q: We used to call it our April Fools report.

INGRAHAM: Well, everybody would normally put down London, Paris and Rome. To get your choice you would have to put down posts no one else would list. After seeing Bolivia, I had had enough of South America so I thought, “Where can one go?” and put down Sri Lanka, Hong Kong and one other far-off post. Lo and behold they sent me to Hong Kong.

When we got off the plane in Hong Kong, within ten minutes I was saying, “Well, this is certainly better than South America.”

Q: What were you doing in Hong Kong?

INGRAHAM: That was a weird one. This was 1950 and the Korean War had just broken out. The Chinese Communists had taken over the Mainland and the children of Chinese-Americans and thousands and thousands of Chinese who had bought slots as the false children of Chinese-Americans were trying to get to the United States. First we had one consular officer, then we had two (this is before I got there), then we had ten, then twenty, and by the time I got there we had about fifty trying to process the citizenship claims of Chinese.

I soon found that ever since the various oriental exclusion acts of the 19th century and early 20th, the Chinese had built up a system to get around these blatantly racist laws and we consular officers were there to stop them. And we did our best to carry out the law, although we all had a certain sympathy for the Chinese, thinking first of all that the law was wrong and secondly these people would make damn good citizens if they did get to the States.

We were assigned to spend entire days interviewing Chinese who claimed American citizenship. Our job was to try to trip them up and prove that their claim was false. Now they knew the claim was false, we knew that they knew the claim was false, and they knew that we knew the claim was false. So it was the sort of game that went on and on and on. Sometimes you won and sometimes they won. I did this for a year and a half.

Q: I dealt with something similar in the Refugee Relief Program in Germany. When you get into these massive programs there is a little disrespect for the law. You are doing it but you don't take it too seriously.

INGRAHAM: Exactly that. You have the feeling that, “Okay, a lot of them are getting through, and I have a case here that I can fight to the hilt or just say 'Oh, what the hell.' So he gets to the States. It is not going to hurt the country. I am not breaking the law, I am just giving up a little early.”

My job was to interview 16-year-olds. The law at the time said that the foreign-born children of an American parent had to live in the States for five years before they became 21, so they would have to get to the U.S. by the time they were 16. They were all male. We would get an affidavit from the alleged father in the States saying, “I left San Francisco on such and such a date, I arrived—there is a little area in China near Canton, Toishan district, where they virtually all came from—at my home village on such and such date. Nine months later my wife gave birth to twin boys. Nine months after that she again gave birth to twin boys. I left the following morning and she was pregnant again.” So 16 years later, the oldest of 6 male children would come into the consulate and say, “I am so-and-so, the son of so-and-so. Here is my affidavit, please give me a passport.”

It was a racket, of course. We all knew it, but as I said, we had sympathy for the victim. Our job was to prove that, say, two little boys who presented affidavit claiming they were brothers had never actually seen each other until they met on the ferry to Hong Kong from Canton. We would ask them questions. “You lived in this village? Was your house the 4th or 5th one from the road? Was it made of brick or mud? Where was the village well?” We would ask one of the boys these questions and then lock him up in the closet and ask the other the same series of questions. I did that for a year and a half.

Q: Of course they had a book which they were studying beforehand about the lay-out of the village, so it was really a matter of how good there memory was.

INGRAHAM: Yes. And the lay-out of the village was also in the files of the Immigration and Nationalization Service in Hawaii, because their false father had gone through the same process when he came to the States, 30, 40 years ago.

While all that was going on—while we were interviewing 16- year-old kids—the Korean War was happening all around us. So Hong Kong was an utterly fascinating place to be. But there was one unhappy development though...we arrived there in the late summer of 1950 and early in 1951 all the Consulate General wives and children were evacuated. This followed the Chinese entry into the Korean War in November, 1950. There was no certainty the Chinese wouldn't keep on marching down to the end of the Korean peninsula and possibly move into Hong Kong. So our Consul General, Walter McConaughy, decided to evacuate wives and children. So my wife and, at that time, one child, went back to the States and spent a year there.

Q: From that assignment you were assigned again to a one-man post.

INGRAHAM: Yes, to Perth, Western Australia. Somehow Perth came open and I guess because I had been at a one-man post before, I was direct transferred there. So one day in the fall of 1951, I flew directly from Hong Kong to Perth. In those days a flight from Hong Kong to Perth was not simply boarding a 747 in Hong Kong and getting off in Perth. I had to fly to Saigon; to Singapore; to Jakarta, where there was lots of arguing trying to get on another plane; to Darwin, where I had to hang around several days; and finally on a DC-3 with a few other passengers and a lot of mining equipment, to Perth. We spent not quite three years there.

Q: Had Perth been open before you arrived?

INGRAHAM: It was opened, I believe, a little before the War. It was more of a purposeful post than Cochabamba, Bolivia, because every passenger ship that came to Australia from Europe would land there first. Perth was a delight. We have been back in Perth...visited it in 1988, and it has turned into one of the most lovely, glowing cities you could find anywhere. After Hong Kong it was at first a bit slow. Hong Kong was glamour, excitement, etc. But Perth turned out to be an utter delight from beginning to end. We were very busy. We had a little bit of everything: even a USIS office that

consisted of one Australian girl. I had to give talks, officiate at flower shows. I was also assiduously reporting on the politics of Western Australia, which was fun but not of any great consequence.

One odd sidelight: since we had come from Hong Kong, some of the Asian students who were at the university in Western Australia got in touch with us. We got to know some of them quite well. One, as a matter of fact, still is a very close friend of ours, living here in Washington. There was also a young Australian student at the university who...at that time most Australians were not interested in Asia, to them home was Europe, the world consisted of Europe and America. Incidentally they particularly loved Americans in Perth because in 1942 Perth had been totally deserted by the Australian Armed Forces. The Australians felt when the Japanese invaded they could hold Melbourne and Sydney and an arc in between, but Perth would have to be given up. Early 1942, the people in Perth told us, they looked out to sea and saw some large ships coming in from a distance. It wasn't until they got close that the people in Perth discovered they were American and not Japanese ships. So the Perth people couldn't have been nicer to Americans, which is true to this day almost anywhere in Australia.

Q: I take it you were pretty much at the end of the leash as far as the Embassy was concerned.

INGRAHAM: The farthest post from Washington in the world. I wrote an article in the Foreign Service Journal on this. And the farthest from its supervisory post of any in the world. So I was very much on my own. Although we were in touch by telephone, etc.

I wanted to mention the one young Australian student who used to join the Asian students when they visited. We had them over to the house quite often, because they were a bit lonely and the Australians didn't quite know what to do with Asians. This young man was interested in Asia and in them. His name was Hawke. He was the nephew of the then Chief Minister of Western Australia. Today he is the Prime Minister of Australia. I hadn't

realized for years that he was the same guy until our Washington-based Asian friend said, “Remember good ol' Bob Hawke?” I said, “My God is that the same Hawke?” And he said, “Of course it is.” Perth was nice.

Q: From Perth, you still did not go back to Washington for an assignment. You were still within the Asian area weren't you?

INGRAHAM: I went to Madras. Why Madras? Well, we saw a movie when we were in Perth, John Renoir's The River. It actually was about Bengal and it gave us thoughts about exotic India, where we had never been. So I asked for India. In those days if you asked for India you got it. We requested Bombay and ended up in Madras. There again an utterly delightful experience. Madras was a consulate general. We had a Consul General. I was the number two, substantially farther down. We had 3 or 4 other officers and a separate USIS post.

Our mission was to follow what was going on in south India, which, as we kept emphasizing, was a totally different world from the north. There was always a certain amount of built-in tension between Madras and New Delhi.

Q: They looked down upon you?

INGRAHAM: Well, our Consul General kept trying to make the point that south India was different. The southerners speak different languages, are from a different ethnic group, from a different culture. They see themselves as Indians but also as Dravidians. They look upon northerners as fellow Indians, yes, but also as foreigners. There was a good deal of ethnic pride in south India at that time. If you spoke Hindi in the street, they would glower at you and small boys might even throw stones. We had a Hindi-speaking officer who was assigned to Madras so he could practice his Hindi. It didn't work.

Q: Who was the Consul General?

INGRAHAM: Hank Ramsey. He died in California two or three years ago.

Q: How did he run the post?

INGRAHAM: I think very well indeed. He gave us our heads. He was the boss, no question about it. He would say, “You do this and you do that.” He would keep us all moving. He would also clue us in on whatever was going on, too. We would meet daily to discuss what was going on. He was a good man. We were following the very lively politics of south India. This was just before the big realignment of the Indian states along linguistic lines that took place in 1956. Much of the agitation and the political activity in south India was aimed at influencing or pushing for linguistic states. All the Tamils would be in one state, the Malayalam speakers in another, etc. Up to that time it had been divided along the old British lines.

It was a revelation of sorts to me because, having been in another developing country, Bolivia, it seemed to me that for the first time I was in a place where we were really in touch with the local political life. For the first time we were reporting what was actually happening rather than just reporting on the little European sliver at the top.

Q: What would you say was the predominant attitude of the Americans towards the Indians and the Indians towards the Americans in your area? We had gone through a rough patch where the Indians had not been very helpful—the Korean business. Was Karela in your district?

INGRAHAM: Yes it was. Karela was the first communist governed state...as far as I know the first state in the world where the communists had been voted in in a free election. Bengal might have been but I think Karela was.

Q: Maybe San Marino.

INGRAHAM: San Marino may have been, but Karela was a substantial state with maybe 10 million people. The best educated people in all of India. And the highest number of Christians, most of whom voted communist.

I think we at the Consulate General were far more sympathetic toward the Indians because we were there. This was the time of Foster Dulles, who felt neutrality was immoral and that if you weren't with us you must be at least partly against us. We had to operate within those strictures. But at the same time, I think, all of us were, at least in Madras, far more sympathetic to the Indian side. At the same time, we would argue with them. I remember giving speeches here and there pointing out the dastardly deeds of the Russians and getting very tough questions from the Indian audience.

Incidentally, English was the language of communication in south India. Almost all the Indians right down to the village level knew at least a few words of English. So our lack of knowledge of Tamil or Malayalam didn't cut us off from people. It was a fascinating period.

Q: Were you under any pressure to do anything about the communist state there?

INGRAHAM: In a way we were. We were to keep a very close eye on Karela and report what was going on, particularly anything that could be used to show what swine they were. Fortunately, it was a very well run state before the communists took over and they didn't ruin it. They actually ran a pretty good government. Yes, they were communists, but I can remember taking a trip through Karela in 1955 or maybe early '56 and being fascinated not only by the problems of the state (which was grossly overpopulated) but by how well they were coping with the mess and—I suppose Bolivia was in the back of my mind—how the poverty seemed to be reasonably well shared. More so than in, lets say, Madras or other parts of south India. Although even in Madras, where poverty was extreme in some places, you didn't have the feeling of a little class at the top running everything and exploiting the people on the bottom- -everybody was poor.

From then on I knew that this was the part of the world that most fascinated me and I had no intentions of leaving.

Q: You left Madras in 1956. Then you went where?

INGRAHAM: I decided I wanted to be a political officer. In Madras I was a jack-of-all-trades. We had a political officer, the one who spoke Hindi, and an economic officer. I did some of the political reporting and also rode herd on the consulate. I was the consular officer, but we had a couple of...this is something common to many South and Southeast Asian posts... Indian employees who had been with the consulate for many years. One of them knew far more about visas than I did and probably as much as the Assistant Secretary who ran consular affairs back in Washington. They had worked for the consulate forever, their loyalty to us was total. They considered themselves part of the family. When we had in-house parties we would include them. They ran the consular section. At first I remember saying, “I had better check out everything very carefully,” having come from Hong Kong (where shortly after I left a number of Americans in the immense consular section had been transferred—one direct from Hong Kong to Atlanta Federal Penitentiary). So I watched the consular work closely in Madras. Everything proved to be absolutely impeccable, so from then on I relaxed and let them get on with it. I would do some political reporting, this and that. At the end of the day I would sign 15, 20 or 30 consular documents absolutely secure in the knowledge that they were properly prepared. That was another virtue of life in Madras.

Q: Careerwise what happened next?

INGRAHAM: I decided I wanted to be a political officer and the avenue to that was language-area training. So I applied for Indonesian language training, was accepted and brought back to the States. I spent about six months in Washington on Indonesian language training and was then sent off in September for an academic year at Cornell for more language training and Southeast Asian area courses. Cornell was one of the centers

of Southeast Asian, particularly Indonesian, area studies at that time. In the summer of 1958 I left for Jakarta as a political officer.

This was my first time, except for that period in La Paz, in an embassy. This was at a time when...we tend to forget Indonesia has disappeared from everyone's attention, you rarely see any mention of Indonesia in the newspapers. These days we tend to forget that around 1958 or '60, if you polled the State Department on which country was the greatest menace in Southeast Asia some would say Vietnam, but many would say Indonesia.

Q: There was Sukarno who was turning from just a plain nationalist into a nationalist who was part of the nonaligned movement which was getting close to the communists.

INGRAHAM: Yes. Here again, this was the period when everything was black or white as far as we were concerned, until 1960 anyway. We were still trying to work with Sukarno. One of the people I admired most in the Foreign Service was Howard Jones, our Ambassador.

Q: I want to talk to you about that. So you got out to Jakarta in the summer of 1958 and stayed until 1960.

INGRAHAM: Jakarta and Medan. In the spring of '59 our consul in Medan, in Sumatra, was bitten by a mad dog, became quite sick, was rushed off to Singapore and had to be transferred out. He would have been transferred in a few months anyway and his replacement was in the process but wouldn't be arriving for a few months. So they sent me there for five months, with my family, to take over the consulate in Medan. So I was in Jakarta for about eight months; in Medan for about five months; then back to Jakarta for the rest of the tour. It was very useful because I came back to Jakarta as the most knowledgeable officer on things Sumatran. And it was at this time, of course, that there was a rather major regional rebellion against the Sukarno government, promoted and

supported by the United States. The basic document was declassified in the 1970's so I can talk about it.

Q: How did you and the Embassy when you first arrived see the internal situation and Sukarno?

INGRAHAM: When I got there, the 1958 rebellion had just been put down by the army under General Nasution, who is still alive. The Indonesian army had shown far more ability than we anticipated, and the officers had shown far more political savvy. At the time we were beginning to see that the eventual struggle within the country would not be between left and right as such but between Sukarno and the army. Actually it was between the communists and the army, with Sukarno increasingly on the communist side. We began to understand this just about the time I arrived.

Indonesia had a parliamentary system in 1958. Piece by piece Sukarno dismantled it and put himself in a position of ever greater personal authority. He was a lousy administrator, but to the average Indonesian in the street he was the embodiment of Indonesian nationalism. He was a magnificent speaker. Here was a person with a very healthy ego, a great deal of talent, a strange grab-bag mind full of all sorts of bits and pieces. Sukarno was no more of a communist than I was because he couldn't accept any authority higher than himself. Here was a case where you could actually watch power corrupting. I don't mean in a monetary sense, but in the power sense. Sukarno would get more power and then go on to seize more and more. He began to see himself as the embodiment of Indonesia. He had enough ability to carry the Indonesian people along with him.

Then things started to go to hell. There was a show-down with the Dutch. The Indonesians nationalized Dutch industries, those that were pouring money into the country, and they soon collapsed. Economic conditions got worse and worse. More circuses, parades and speeches by Sukarno, less money and more hungry people. Meanwhile the army was coalescing and moving away from Sukarno.

Now through all this, Jones had established a unique personal relationship with Sukarno. Jones has been widely criticized for being taken to the cleaners by Sukarno, but that is nonsense. He knew exactly what Sukarno was doing. He would explain to me, “Ed, we have got to hang on here. Sukarno is moving away from us. He has given us (let's say it was 1960, getting pretty late in the game) due cause to break relations but we will be the losers if we leave Indonesia to the other side. If we have to undergo humiliations here, we are a big country and can stand it. Live through it if we must, but stay on because something is going to happen.” “Well, Mr. Ambassador, like what?” “Ed, I don't know. But something is going to happen and we have to be here when it does. And perhaps to try to help it happen.” This was his whole approach.

Q: There were partisans on both sides. That Sukarno would be making a speech condemning the United States and Jones would just sit there rather than walk out. How about you and other officers in the Embassy? How did you feel about this? What was the atmosphere, particularly in the political section?

INGRAHAM: It was a bit mixed, but basically I think we understood what Jones wanted and what he meant. Basically we were on his side, I think. There was some criticism. A number of us felt on a few occasions he might have gone too far. Sukarno would get up and dance an Indonesian folk dance and Jones would be right up there with him. Jones was the last Westerner who had entre to Sukarno. Sukarno would make an anti-American speech and Jones would just sit there. But later on Jones would go see Sukarno and say, “Damn it...” I accompanied him on one or two of those calls. Jones would speak frankly to Sukarno. He was such a sunny, pleasant guy that he could say some pretty nasty things but say them in a way that Sukarno would take. Sukarno, at least at that stage, wasn't beyond reach. He was a warm person himself and he responded to Jones' personal approach. I think if you dug down deep enough in his psyche, Sukarno was a colonial subject who wanted to show the world that he was as good as the white men who had run Indonesia for 300 years.

Q: Were there instructions from the Desk to the Embassy saying to get a little tougher or...?

INGRAHAM: Yes there were. Washington was inclined to want to push Sukarno harder. It was a difference of degree. The people on the Desk in Washington at that time knew Indonesia. Frank Underhill in particular, an old Indonesian hand. Others on the Desk also knew the area reasonably well and understood what was going on. One of the problems, as I later found in Washington, was trying to sell it to the 7th floor of the State Department.

Anyway, I think Jones did keep us in there long enough so that when the inevitable—which he knew was going to happen—did happen, we were still there.

Q: That was in '63?

INGRAHAM: '65. It was funny. Jones left about six months before the 1965 explosion. He had really worn himself out. But he kept us in there for a long time.

Q: While we were trying to keep a foot in the door how did you see the role of CIA?

INGRAHAM: They were there. They were all over the place. But the operation that they were so happy about, the '58 rebellion, had simply fallen apart. While we were in Medan those five months there was a lovely resort up at Lake Toba but we couldn't use it because it was still in rebel hands. I can remember driving down to the Goodyear rubber estate at Wingfoot, about a hundred miles south of Medan. There was an area through which you drove as fast as you could, because it was rebel-held. When you visited the big rubber estates, you would find the foreign staff all hunkered down in a series of isolated strong points with the police all around them. They were under siege by the rebel forces that had lost the rebellion but were still fighting a guerrilla war against Jakarta, trying to cut off its sources of foreign exchange by destroying the rubber estates. I would drive down to visit the estates and talk to the British and Americans there. At Goodyear, for example, they would tell me, “Well, damn it, the rebels did such and such and chopped down 600 of our

trees. Just two weeks ago they shot up one of the collection stations." And so on. It was a nuisance warfare because the rebels had been beaten. They had started out big by taking over the oil facilities in Palembang but the army under Nasution mounted an operation that drove them out into the jungle and broke the back of the rebellion in Sumatra. The rebels fought on longer in Sulawesi but in a month or so they were defeated there too.

Then of course there was that last incident in the 1958 rebellion, that happened just before I got there. The rebels had an air force of about a half dozen U.S.-supplied B26s which operated over eastern Indonesia. One day in May 1958 they dropped a few bombs over Ambon. One bomb killed a fair number of people. Somebody managed to fire an anti-aircraft gun and hit the B26 and out came two parachutes. One of them was an Indonesian and the other was a man named Allen Pope. In his pocket was a membership card to the officer's club at the American air base at Clark Field. Pope was in jail the whole time I was in Indonesia. His trial took place in Jakarta, broadcast to the whole population. Pope was found guilty, sentenced to death and held in a prison in the Jakarta suburbs. His main complaint while he was there was that he didn't get enough exercise. We junior embassy officers would bring mail to him. Pope maintained from the very beginning, "Well, yes I was in the American air force and used to fly for Air America in Vietnam but I decided on my own that I would leave the air force because I wanted to join the Indonesian rebels in fighting the communists." He stuck to that story. The Indonesians knew he wasn't telling the truth. And he knew that they knew. But he stuck to the story. After they sentenced him to death, he was kept in a small cottage inside the prison walls. I remember that I once had to carry some weights over to him because he wasn't getting enough exercise. He was an impressive guy. He was not a brilliant man of the world, but he stuck to his cover story to the end.

Eventually we all realized that the Indonesians were not going to execute him even though he was under a death sentence. Our problem then was to get him freed. After I left Indonesia, Bobby Kennedy came out to Indonesia. This was when the Kennedy Administration was making an all-out effort to reverse the trend and try to win back

Sukarno. Bobby asked Sukarno what could be done about Pope. “Isn't there some way?” Sukarno said he would take care of it. A few months later there was a brief item in the local newspapers—”The following former rebels have been released:” There followed a long list of Indonesian names. Nestled in the middle of them was “Allen Pope”.

Q: Even though we were on opposite sides, it sounds as if the Indonesian leaders at least were accessible.

INGRAHAM: Yes, however bad the relations between our countries were and however much we disliked what they were doing, they were accessible. Jones could see Sukarno. He could just walk in. Jones' most regular contact was Subandrio. He was one of the most utterly amoral and brilliant men I have ever come across. He was the Foreign Minister and deputy Prime Minister. Machiavelli was a child compared to Subandrio. But he was always accessible. Not to me, but to Jones and his DCM.

I could call up the people in the Foreign Ministry—it would take about six hours to make a phone call because the phones didn't work, but once I got someone they would say, “Sure come on over.” They were accessible.

And traveling around the countryside, yes, we did a lot of traveling. You would go to a town, say, in central Java where there were a lot of communists moving out into the countryside. You would go to a village and you could talk to the villagers. Most of us spoke enough Indonesian so that we could carry on a reasonable conversation. You could ask them how things were going, what about the communists, etc. They were always accessible. They told us what we wanted to hear, but they were accessible. We went all over the country. We couldn't travel in areas where there was actual fighting going on, but just about everywhere else.

Q: When you left Jakarta, how did you feel about Indonesia?

INGRAHAM: I felt Indonesia was going pretty much to hell. I didn't know what was going to happen to the country, except one niggling thought at the back of my mind that these people were not fanatics, that there was an element of reason behind most of them and they were not going to go over the precipice into something like China in 1948. I thought, “There is a way out of this, and the main obstacle is Sukarno.”

When I left Jakarta I had been overseas for 15 years so I had a tour of duty in Washington. I initially spent two years as Desk officer for Australian Affairs. It was a pleasant two years. My main job was negotiating and riding herd on various defense agreements that we and the Australians were working on to use Australian territory in satellite reconnaissance and other such projects. We were just beginning to get into space.

The Australians were probably the most cooperative of all our Allies at that time. Our way of life was compatible so it was one of the military's favorite countries for locating such installations as the one in Northwest Cape for tracking submarines in the Indian Ocean. The Australians were totally cooperative.

Then, of course, these were the big China days, when the Sino- Soviet bloc was coming apart and we worried most about China. We saw Australia as one of the southern bastions against expanding Chinese power.

It was a pleasant but not too exciting two years. Then I was named Indonesian Desk officer.

Q: This was '62?

INGRAHAM: 1962-65 I was Indonesian Desk officer. That was one of the more fascinating, challenging jobs I have ever had because it was the time when things were going from bad to worse with Sukarno in Indonesia. The Communist Party, the PKI, by that time had become the third largest in the world after China and the Soviet. Most of the members weren't dedicated Communists. For 90 percent of them, if you said “Marx”

and they had been to a movie they would think “Groucho.” They didn't necessarily know communism. All they knew was that they were poor and there were richer people than they. The communists told them they could have more goodies such as education for their children if they joined the party. The Communist Party was growing by leaps and bounds.

Java is intrinsically a poor part of the world. I believe Java and Bangladesh are the two most densely populated rural areas on earth. It is very fertile land but mountainous. The Javanese had evolved a strange intricate system, a labor-intensive society where everything was interlocked and ruled by tradition. You couldn't cut the rice with a large scythe, you had to use little hand knives and cut one grain at a time. The reason—you don't want to disturb the rice goddess. The people are Muslims, but not intense Muslims. They would burn a pinch of incense to the tree goddess before going to the mosque on Friday. But basically the problem for them was to spread the labor. There were landowners and the landless. It was the landless who became PKI members. The landowners were not fat cats with huge holdings. Usually they owned only four or five acres. And they lived on the land and their family worked on the land and they hired landless labor to supplement their own work. And tradition dictated which landless labor they hired and how many. It was a system in which some people were much better off than others, but nobody was living really high on the hog.

Then the PKI moved in. They began to indoctrinate the landless labor, who had plenty of reason to feel sorry for themselves. Into the intricate Javanese system they brought a new element, a very disruptive element, that turned the landless against the civil authorities and the peasants who had land...brought a split into the society and threatened the society. Something was going to do that anyway, I suppose. It greatly increased tension throughout Java and tremendously increased the power of the Communist Party in Java.

One of the PKI's main sources of strength was Sukarno. He was not a communist, he saw himself above politics, but when he gave a speech...they were marvelous speeches...the Communists could rally 100,000 people to stand and scream their support. It was the

Communist Party that could organize great numbers to march through the streets and snarl at us while passing the American Embassy. They were not anti-American because they didn't like Americans, they were anti-American because they didn't like a country being so nasty to Sukarno.

Anyway, it got worse and worse. Sukarno was using as one of his primary weapons Indonesia's claim to West Irian, the Indonesian name for the former Netherlands New Guinea, the western half of the island of New Guinea that the Dutch kept from the Indonesians in 1949 when they conceded the rest of the Netherlands Indies to the Indonesian nationalists. For years Sukarno insisted that West Irian was part of Indonesia. The Dutch would claim that the people of West Irian were not Indonesians, that they were totally different people and must be protected by the Dutch until they were mature enough to become independent. They had nothing to do with Indonesia, according to the Dutch.

Well this wasn't true. The people of West Irian were not of Malay origin as were most Indonesians but of Melanesian origin. But so were many thousands of people in the eastern Indonesian islands, while millions more were a blend of Malay and Melanesian. Getting West Irian from the Dutch became a great goal for Sukarno and the Indonesians.

The Indonesians pushed the issue in the United Nations and everywhere. Sukarno, especially, used it for beating the West as a whole. It also split the State Department because the Dutch were one of the most cooperative of all our NATO Allies. Naturally the European Bureau said we couldn't do anything to upset the Dutch while the East Asian Bureau was saying, look, you can't lose Indonesia just to placate the Dutch.

I was part of it. I was the one writing the East Asia Bureau's memos and position papers, arguing with the European Desks and fighting the bureaucratic wars. The end result was paralysis. The Administration's position became one of neutrality, supporting neither the Indonesian nor the Dutch. Since the Dutch physically held West Irian, we kept arguing that our policy wasn't so much neutral as pro-Dutch.

Anyway, this went on through the end of the Eisenhower Administration. Then Kennedy came in and said, “Let's try an entirely new approach.” Let us try to settle the West Irian issue, which we did. Ellsworth Bunker was named by Kennedy to mediate the dispute and he did, with the active support of the White House. By that time the Dutch were becoming just a little bit tired of the whole thing. It was costing them a fortune. They were honest. Their principles were that the people of West Irian were wards and they had to stay with them. They were also madder than hell at the Indonesians because, after all, they had fought a 4-year war of independence against the Dutch. So, with a good deal of prodding and careful work by the Kennedy Administration, Bobby Kennedy in particular...it was the only time I ever met him. I remember Jones and I went to call on him on one occasion. Bobby Kennedy knew a surprising amount about Indonesia, Sukarno, West Irian and all that. He had informed himself on the topic. And, yes, we worked out a settlement between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Interestingly enough, way back in 1959 John Henderson, our political counselor in Jakarta, got his political officers together and said, “Let us work out what we think should happen. The big issue is West New Guinea. Let's have a seminar among ourselves.” First we worked out a rationale for changing our policy— about 15-18 pages—and then a proposal for how to change it. I was the one assigned to writing them up. They were not my ideas, they were joint ideas. Jones signed my two despatches and sent them to Washington. And it was exactly the course we eventually followed three years later.

So the Kennedy Administration did work out the agreement that turned West Irian over to the United Nations, just as we in Jakarta had proposed in 1959. The United Nations governed it for a year and then held a sort of plebiscite.

Q: It would be pretty hard to hold a plebiscite.

INGRAHAM: Well, first of all they were holding a plebiscite asking people whether they wanted to be part of Indonesia or part of the Netherlands. They were asking a bunch of

people who would reply: “What is Indonesia, what is the Netherlands?” Anyway, West Irian was turned over to Indonesia. The next August 17, Indonesian Independence Day, Sukarno entitled his speech “A Year of Triumph.”

We thought, fine, everything is on track again, our great impediment is wiped out and we will now be able to draw Indonesia back into “the free world.” Well that lasted about a year and then the Brits decided to do something with Malaya and Singapore and their North Borneo Territories, Sabah and Sarawak. The British idea was to combine them into the new nation of Malaysia— a very sensible idea. The Brits made one great mistake and I think privately they will admit it. If they had gone to Sukarno at the very beginning and said they were thinking about doing this and what did he think about it—work with him, it would have been okay. But they completely... I think they just forgot to.

So Malaysia is announced. Sukarno rises in wrath and complains, “I was not consulted.” The next thing you know a little rebellion breaks out in Sarawak, I think, and in Brunei. And the Indonesians support it by sending arms and guerrillas across the border and we have the Malaysia/Sarawak/Borneo crisis. The crisis continued right up to the end of the Sukarno regime. That got worse, and worse and worse. Sukarno was supporting the overthrow of the Malaysia project. We were saying, “No, no, please don't do it.” He was ignoring us. We still were trying to capitalize on what we felt was the advantage gained from our role in the West Irian settlement. Power had really corrupted him by that stage. He just thought, “I can do no wrong.” And the Chinese and the Russians were flattering the hell out of him. The Russians began to give him lots of modern military equipment. We weren't terribly worried because the Indonesian army, good as it was, wasn't on the same level as we were beginning to discover the North Vietnamese army was. But in the early '60s, let's say '63, '64, '65, if you stopped anybody in the State Department who had been dealing with East Asia, he would be hard pressed to say whether the worse menace was in Vietnam or in Indonesia. Of course, Indonesia was so much larger and more

strategically located than Vietnam. A lot of us thought “the hell with Vietnam; Indonesia is where its going to happen.” Well, of course, it did in 1965.

But in the meantime I was the Desk officer and I was getting it from all sides. I never worked harder and longer in my life. I would get home about 8:00 at night. The phone would ring at 2:00 in the morning and I would hear, “Hello, Mr. Ingraham, this is the Watch Officer, I thought you would want to know they just burned down the library in Surabaya.” And I would say, “For Christ sake, what am I supposed to do about it at two a.m.?” He would say, “I don't know Mr. Ingraham, I was just told to call you.” So I would lie awake the rest of the night with my stomach churning.

Q: Averell Harriman was Assistant Secretary for East Asia at that time. How did he deal with you and what was his attitude towards Indonesia?

INGRAHAM: It was interesting. He accepted, by and large, the Jones theory that we had to hang on until the last bitter gasp because we gain nothing by leaving. By this time we could easily have broken relations and taken action against...not quite militarily, although military could have been on the horizon. Harriman fought against this. He was a strange man. His factual knowledge of the area was just about nil. He learned a bit, but he wasn't a great student. But he had the most exquisitely honed political instincts. You would go up to him and say, “This, this and this have happened. We think you should do this, this and this.” He would ask some very sharp questions and then say, “Okay go ahead and do it.” You could ask him, “Well, why do you think we should?” And he would snap, “Never mind. Go ahead and do it.” The “never mind” was a way of saying, “I haven't the faintest idea about the details of what you have proposed, but my instinct tells me to do it.” And it was a good instinct.

There was no one that Harriman would kowtow to. He fought our battles against the European Bureau, which had switched about a bit. First it was the Dutch but now it was the Brits, with the Indonesian attack on Malaysia. Of course, we also had Malaysia in

our area, so even within the East Asia Bureau there was somewhat of a split. Meanwhile Jones was out there saying, “Hang on, hang on, hang on;” seeing Sukarno probably every third day and saying, “For God's sake don't do this.”

Q: Were you feeling media and/or Congressional pressure about this policy?

INGRAHAM: Yes. Once Evans or Novak—can't remember which— had me out for lunch at the Metropolitan Club as I filled him in on Indonesian lore. Yeah. The press was always calling me. Every morning we worked out the line we were going to use with the press that day. I was in the middle of everything. I got hauled up to the Hill for...actually I wasn't the main one, I would go along while Harriman or more likely one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries would go up to the Hill to testify. Congress was always angry at Sukarno because he was so damn flamboyant.

So it went on, getting worse and worse and worse. Then came the night of September 30, 1965.

Q: You were still Desk officer?

INGRAHAM: No.

Q: When did you leave?

INGRAHAM: A month earlier in August, 1965. After three years on the Desk I was assigned to the next National War College class. My successor took over and within a month everything...

Q: Who was your successor?

INGRAHAM: I can't remember his name.

Q: Anyway this was when Sukarno was successfully set aside by the army.

INGRAHAM: Yes. One of the great unheralded events of the mid- 20th century, if you think about it. Also, Jones, just a month or two earlier had finally been pulled out. Sukarno had asked him to stay on, but we had just about reached the stage where we felt it hadn't worked, so let's really put Sukarno in the enemy camp and consider him along with the rest of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Just give up on Sukarno and consider Indonesia hostile.

Jones left Jakarta and Marshall Green, our Deputy Assistant Secretary, was appointed Ambassador. I remember his speech for use when he presented his credentials. He never used the speech because the presentation of his credentials was done in the dead of night. Sort of, “I'll take your credentials, now go away.”

He had only been there a couple of months—hard, hard months— when September 30 came up.

Q: We have a fairly long interview with him on this. Why don't we move to your next assignment? Your next assignment was to the War College. You were there from '65-'66. And then you went to Rangoon. You were there as what?

INGRAHAM: Political Counselor.

Q: How did that assignment come about?

INGRAHAM: I haven't the faintest idea. I did not want to go to Rangoon. I wanted to go back to the more open world of Southeast Asia, to Malaysia or perhaps even back to Indonesia, but there was Burma. So with some trepidations off we went to Burma. It turned out to be a pleasant but not terribly exciting three years.

Q: What was the situation in Burma when you went there? You were there from '66-'69.

INGRAHAM: Burma was a country whose first contact with the Western world came in 1825. Earlier they had been the great conquerors of Southeast Asia on several occasions.

They thought a great deal of themselves. In 1825 they got into a war with the Brits. They thought, “We have beaten and occupied Thailand; we even have beaten the center of all power in the universe, China.” (They in fact had done so in a border war.) “So here are the Brits over there in India; lets take over Assam.” So they sent their army off to take over Assam and they beat the hell out of the Brits. But the one thing the Brits had that the Chinese didn't have was a navy. So while they were beating the British in Assam, the British navy was seizing Rangoon and that was the end of the war. And, as the Burmese would tell us, ever since then, every contact with the outside world has been a disaster.

They had another war with the Brits in 1852 and lost more territory. Finally in the 1870s there was the third Burma War which ended up with all of Burma being annexed by the Brits and made a part of India. The latter was even worse than being annexed. The British didn't actually mistreat the Burmese. They pretty much ignored the Burmese and didn't recognize Burma's separate existence.

Then came World War II. The Burmese welcomed the Japanese with open arms until the Japanese made it very clear that they were going to behave in a way that even the British never did.

So the Burmese at that stage became even more convinced that every time the outside world comes to them, it is a disaster.

In the late '40s and '50s Burma pretty well fell apart. There was a democratic government in Rangoon with several very well meaning people...U Nu was one of them, a saintly man. I met him years ago when he came to Washington. He just was not the kind of leader to hold the country together. When it inevitably fell apart, the army commander, Ne Win, took power. He straightened things out and turned the government back to the civilians, who proceeded to screw up again, so Ne Win threw them out and took power for the second time just before we arrived.

Q: Ne Win was in the saddle when you arrived?

INGRAHAM: Yes. He was married to his second wife, Kitty.

The whole time we were in Burma our governments got along reasonably well. It was a country that wasn't causing us any trouble. And there were virtually no American commercial or private interests in the country. We used to laugh and say, “Well, we had the American business community in for dinner last night, with his wife and two lovely children.” It was a totally isolated place. We were dutifully reporting what was going on in Burma to Washington, but Washington's interest by that time was all Vietnam. Nobody cared about Burma, which was more or less what the Burmese wanted. Except...there was something called the Burmese way to socialism, which was socialism with an ethnic cast to it...to us socialism involves public control, government ownership, etc., but to the Burmese it was much more simple. Capitalism—you walked into a store to buy something and there was an Indian sitting behind the counter; Socialism—the Indian was back in India and there was a Burmese sitting behind the counter. That was what Ne Win and his people imposed on Burma. Unfortunately the Burmese sitting behind the counter didn't know what to do next when the shelves were bare. So that was Burma for three years.

Now things have gone to hell. Ne Win has grown old, brutal and mean. But in those days the country was doing about as well as it could. There was a loosening up when we were there. U Nu was let out of prison along with various others from his era. Burma was doing, in every way except economically, reasonably well. It was a fairly quiet period in Burmese history.

One thing about Burma I soon discovered, after serving in India and Indonesia...Burma was always listed among the very poorest countries of the world in those days. Its per capita GNP was below even India's. But I would go out into the countryside and there would be no comparison whatsoever. The rural Burmese were infinitely better off than the people of India. It was just that they were largely outside the monetized economy.

We were free to travel almost all over Burma and we did. (You can't do that now and you couldn't do it before.) We had no trouble anywhere. We were welcomed everywhere. Wherever we went we found a relatively prosperous countryside. The cities were pretty much of a mess. They were not magnets. They hadn't drawn people from the countryside, partly because the cities had so little to offer and the countryside so much to offer. The current picture we have of most of the third world is of these massive Mexico Cities with their 15 million people. That wasn't happening in Burma. You had a society that really wasn't badly off at all, except for some of the people in the cities.

Every time we would go to Thailand, on business or for a weekend shopping tour, we would have about 15 Burmese friends asking us to bring back such exotic things as a fan belt for a 1961 Ford. Would you bring us some toothpaste? Things like that. We would go to Bangkok and come back loaded down. The Burmese customs were easy going. Once I brought back 144 tennis balls. It was a pleasant, not terribly busy life.

One thing that was fascinating about Rangoon at that time was...this was a totally neutral country. It was so neutral that it wouldn't even join the neutral nations. Because of that, everybody was represented in Rangoon. We had North Koreans, South Koreans, North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, East Germans, West Germans, the whole schmear was there. And because there was so little else to do, and the Burmese government, while it was more or less approachable, kept all foreigners at arms' lengths...we could always call on them but we didn't get much out of them. Burmese officials rarely came to our houses; many would have loved to come but they didn't quite dare. At the same time they were friendly and available when necessary. So the diplomatic corps was thrown in on itself, and it was one place in the world where virtually all of us were represented. There was a hotel, the Inya Lake, where (given the 50 or so countries represented) about once a week we would have a national day, and the reception would always be there. We would all find ourselves thrown in together. The East Germans and the West Germans...that cute

East German girl and all the rest. This was the height of the Cold War and we were not supposed to be that friendly with each other.

One of my jobs was to work fairly closely with the South Vietnamese representative and the Cambodian representative, particularly the South Vietnamese. We would share things with him and let him use our facilities now and then. And we would pass information back to Washington that he couldn't get to Saigon, that kind of thing. He was a very decent man. I can't think of his name. He was a career type, hard working. He was making no dent on the Burmese, but then again neither were the North Vietnamese.

Q: You had two rather hard-charging ambassadors while you were there—Henry Byroade and Art Hummel. How did they operate in this sort of benign atmosphere?

INGRAHAM: Ah. It wasn't quite benign at the beginning. I arrived shortly after Byroade. Now, back in the '50s we had briefly supported the KMT army that had been chased out of Western China and ended up in northern Burma. We had provided arms for them and encouraged them to go back in to China, which I think they did once or twice and got the hell beat out of them. Then they decided opium cultivating was easier. The Burmese were deeply suspicious of us because we had initially supported the KMT army. They didn't like it. They had a centuries-old distrust of China and suspected we were trying to force them into our orbit.

Then Byroade, a former military man and trouble-shooter, arrived. Tense situation. The Burmese were sure we were up to no good. Byroade's first move, oddly enough, was to...Ed Law Yone had been the editor of the local newspaper, had run afoul of the military and had been carted off to jail. Ed Law Yone had a Rolls Royce. He sold it to Byroade, who had it taken to the Embassy residence. Byroade himself took that car apart down to the last bearing and put it back together, adding leopard skin seats and teak paneling. He would spend most of the day at the residence working on the car. You would ask, “What the hell is the Ambassador doing?” The answer was that Byroade knew exactly what

he was doing. Hank figured out that the Burmese were suspicious of him and assumed he was engaged in all sorts of covert doings. Military background, all that kind of stuff, had been in Egypt and everywhere. They would be certain he was up to no good. So he showed them utter relaxation. He would come into the office about 10:00 in the morning (the Burmese would be following him) and leave early. The Burmese would wonder what nefarious activities he was engaged in, and then the word would get back to the Burmese security people that he was back under that car again. I thought it was a brilliant bit of psychological diplomacy.

The thing is, Byroade rather liked it that way too. Byroade was not one of the world's workaholics by any means. But in this case he was doing exactly what needed doing. It was done consciously. At the very beginning he disarmed the Burmese by showing he was not out there to take over their country. Then he began to work on Ne Win. He established a sort of a friendship with Kitty Ne Win, the wife. Byroade was known as quite a lady's man. We used to laugh in Rangoon and say, “When the British Ambassador or the Chinese Ambassador talked to Kitty Ne Win they were talking to the wife of the Head of State. When Byroade talked to her, he was talking to a woman and she knew it.” She got to rather like him and then so did Ne Win. They would invite Byroade to the Palace and that sort of thing.

So he maintained as good relations as he could with the Burmese, despite their touchy, scrupulous neutrality. It was a rather pleasant three years.

Q: You left there in 1969 and then went back to Washington for a couple of years in INR. What were you doing there?

INGRAHAM: I was the second deputy director of research and analyses for East Asia. Evelyn Colbert was the other deputy director, who took care of Japan, China and various other countries. I took care of the Southeast Asian countries. I had a team of analysts working for me who in some cases had had experience in the country and others who

had had years of experience in INR working on the country. We drew up some very good analyses.

Q: Did you have any feeling they were well used, or was this almost an enclosed system?

INGRAHAM: It was almost an enclosed system, the parts I was working on, because Vietnam had become the center of everything. I didn't handle Vietnam, Evelyn Colbert did. All the people higher up wanted to know about was Vietnam. We were getting swept up into Vietnam during that period.

Q: By that time the other places... Indonesia had gone through its convolution and...

INGRAHAM: Yes, Indonesia had gone through its convolution. Malaysia was doing reasonably well. Indonesia was doing so well that everyone who followed Indonesia was amazed. Nothing much was going on in the areas I covered. Everything was Vietnam. So my job was relatively easy. We drafted analyses which didn't make much of a splash because...

Q: There were no crises. What did you do between 1971 and 1974, before you went to Islamabad?

INGRAHAM: I went to Islamabad in 1971. I was a year and a half in INR and, frankly, it was an interesting job in its way but wasn't anywhere near the center of things. Then I heard they were looking for a political counselor for Islamabad so I made a few phone calls saying, “I would love it.” Next thing I knew, off I went to Islamabad.

Q: So you were in Islamabad from 1971 to when?

INGRAHAM: 1971-74.

Q: What was the situation in Pakistan during that time?

INGRAHAM: Now this was a crucial, key period in Pakistan's history. It was exciting to be there. When I arrived in the summer of '71, there had been quite a cataclysm in Pakistan. After years of a rather benign dictatorship under Ayub Khan, for some weird reason the government decided to hold free elections. So they held free elections. Now the majority of Pakistanis were Bengalis from East Pakistan—55 million to 45 million, something like that—but the country from the beginning had been run totally from the West. There was something called rather condescendingly “second capital” in Dhaka. The Punjabis ran the country. The Bengalis were second-class citizens, even though most of the foreign exchange came from East Bengal—jute primarily. So you had a country of two separate people who spoke different languages, with totally different cultures. The only thing they had in common was Islam. And because of the strange doings of the Indian partition of 1947, the two parts of the country were separated by a thousand miles of India. By the time I got there it seemed utterly doomed. They had held those free elections. All the Bengalis had united behind Sheikh Mujib and his party. In the West meanwhile there were three or four parties. The Bengalis had won an absolute majority in the parliament in Islamabad. The East Pakistanis had taken over the government lock, stock and barrel. Well, the West Pakistani politicians and the army simply couldn't stand this. So they promptly annulled the election, threw everybody in jail, declared martial law, sent the Punjabi army to East Pakistan and the debacle started.

The East Pakistanis were supported diplomatically and materially by India. The Pakistan army in East Pakistan behaved very badly, not quite as badly as the Iraqis, but on that level. They didn't really consider the Bengalis to be fellow citizens. They considered them groveling, inferior beings. They shot them up, raped, murdered, burned down villages, etc. India began supporting Bengali guerrillas coming in from India. Hundreds of thousands, and eventually millions, of refugees moved into adjoining India, putting a terrific strain on the Indians. The Indians stepped up their aid to the guerrillas to get rid of Pakistani control and permit the refugees to go home.

So we had the crisis. We were sitting in Islamabad, we had a consulate in Dhaka. I remember spending three weeks in Dhaka in October 1971.

Q: Arch Blood was the Consul General at that time wasn't he?

INGRAHAM: Yes, he was.

Q: Did you see a problem between your being in Islamabad and having your contacts seeing it one way and then the Consul General in East Pakistan seeing it another way? Did this cause problems?

INGRAHAM: Not really. Some problems but not as many as you might think. We in Islamabad, particularly after my trip to Dhaka, realized that...from the time I arrived we believed Pakistan was doomed. A split was inevitable. In fact it had already occurred. But Washington wouldn't believe this. And so our quarrel was with Washington, yet at the same time we didn't want to tell Washington to switch policy. At that time we had a more or less neutral policy. Unfortunately it got hung up with Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon and their globaloney. They saw Pakistan as a firm base for CENTO—Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran, the eternal Iran standing as the center piece. Washington was pro-Pakistan. We had built, supported and maintained the Pakistanis. Years earlier Ayub Khan had come to Washington and said, “I have one of the finest armies in Asia and it will be at your disposal. All I need are the weapons.” And he got them. But by 1971 we had a not-very-bright general in charge in Islamabad, General Yahya Khan.

We in Islamabad found ourselves at odds more with Washington than we did with Dhaka in this period leading up to the December 1971 war. Washington—Henry Kissinger —had looked at a map and said, “We need this piece of real estate. Forget what is happening inside the country. It is a part of my overall strategy to surround the Soviet Union.” Pakistan was also a member of SEATO— the bridge country between SEATO and CENTO. To the highest levels in Washington, Pakistan wasn't a country approaching

chaos but a piece of the global jigsaw puzzle. So we found ourselves constantly bickering with Washington.

Now the internal structure of the Embassy was rather strange at that time because we had an ambassador who was, to put it mildly, a lightweight.

Q: This was...?

INGRAHAM: Joe Farland. He had been head of a large coal company in West Virginia. He had become head by hard work, perspicacity and marrying the boss' daughter. It was the Christopher Coal Company and her maiden name was Christopher. Farland was a heavy contributor to the Republican Party and had bought ambassadorships before—in the Dominican Republic under Trujillo. To show the depth of his political perception, he once said, “Ed, you don't understand; Trujillo was a fine man, he was just misled by evil companions.” I said, “Oh, is that so Mr. Ambassador.” Fortunately he had a deputy, Sid Sober. The Ambassador generally realized that he didn't really know what was going on so he let Sid Sober run the Embassy. He made lots of trips back to the States—business trips where he would be gone for a month or so with his family. He also had a lovely place up in the hill station, Murree, about 50 miles out of Islamabad, and every Friday, or Thursday if he could, he would go up and spend the weekend. He would be closeted there, drinking and playing games and that sort of things. He loved to fish too. Then he would come back to Islamabad Sunday or Monday.

Sid Sober, meanwhile, ran the show. Fortunately, as I say, Farland realized that foreign policy was not his bag and that he had a good deputy. He didn't put his finger in the machinery very often.

In late 1971, of course, things went from bad to worse. We had a teenage daughter who was going to boarding school in India. My wife and I drove across the border in November 1971, and on up to Mussoorie in India; picked up our daughter from the school; spent a little time traveling around India; and then drove back across the border on December 3.

Rather than spending the night at Lahore, we decided to drive straight on to Islamabad. The roads were clogged with army trucks. As we pulled into our driveway in Islamabad the air raid sirens went off and the war started. Had I been one day later, the Political Counselor at the Embassy in Islamabad would have been on the Indian side of the border for the duration.

We were in Islamabad throughout the war, but it only lasted two weeks. Our DCM, who had been running the Embassy, was on home leave in the States.

Q: Sid Sober.

INGRAHAM: Sid Sober. Joe Farland was trying to run the Embassy. He had no idea what to do, so he did nothing. By coincidence, that was exactly what we should have done. Sheer accident but it worked. We didn't evacuate, although most of the other embassies did. We kept our people there. We did evacuate the staff from the Lahore consulate general.

It was a strange war. Blackout curtains. The Indians never touched Islamabad, but the airport was just a few miles away. I can remember in the evenings, in this lovely city with mountain ranges surrounding us and jackals howling, we would go out on our upstairs terrace just after sunset and sit, surrounded by flowers and potted palms, with the servants padding in and out keeping our glasses filled, while we watched the Indian air force bomb the airport. One of the airplanes they hit belonged to the head of our military mission in Islamabad, a fellow named Chuck Yeager.

Q: Oh yes. One of the first astronauts.

INGRAHAM: He was the first man to break the sound barrier and he was quite a hero. Chuck Yeager had a small plane assigned to him, that he used to use primarily to fly the ambassador around the country on fishing trips. Well, an Indian fighter plane came racing down the runway and saw only two planes there so he took them both out. I remember

Yeager coming in, shouting, “This is an atrocity. They knew it was my plane. This is an insult to the President of the United States. They are going to pay for this.” I said, “Chuck, the Indian pilot is coming in over an enemy airport at 500 miles an hour and is under fire. He sees an airplane, what does he do, check the registration?” Chuck looked at me and said, “You are disloyal.”

Q: You say that you were probably doing the right thing by doing nothing, but were you getting the feeling that our Embassy in New Delhi was weighing in India-wise, or did you find...?

INGRAHAM: Yes, the Embassy in Delhi was weighing in very definitely. I forget who our Ambassador was at that time, but yes, they were definitely at odds with Washington. We were half on their side, because we felt the war ought to stop and India should end it once Bangladesh had broken off. Washington was charging that Indira Gandhi intended to send her army into what was left of Pakistan...the Pakistanis were absolutely convinced that the Indians were going to reverse the 1947 partition and reabsorb them. The Pakistanis started the war, incidentally. Their armies were being decimated in East Pakistan. Indian intervention was becoming ever more open, so the Pakistanis took a deep breath and said, “Lets attack in the West.”

The war only lasted two weeks. Wisely, Indira Gandhi blew the whistle and stopped the war without taking any Pakistani territory as soon as the Pakistani general in the East surrendered. The defeat caused a turnover in Pakistan. Yahya Khan...a decent man I guess, not very bright, drank a lot—he was the only man Joe Farland knew in the government because he would call Farland over to drink with him. He didn't want to talk about politics, he just wanted a drinking partner. Farland was dense enough so that the two of them got along quite well.

Anyway, Yahya Khan resigned. It was a sad resignation, because the war had been lost, and he had had a great deal to drink and his voice came over the radio—they didn't show

him on television, they simply showed the radio. His last act was to order the execution of Sheikh Mujib. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto suddenly emerged as the new leader. The first thing he did was to cancel the execution. He then put Mujib on a plane and had him flown to England, saving his life. Bhutto then became first Prime Minister and then President.

Bhutto was one of the most fascinating characters ever. He had great flaws. He was egotistical, somewhat dishonest, but he also was a man of considerable brilliance and he wanted the best for Pakistan. I did see a fair amount of him. He was a person you could hardly trust but very often admire. He saved Pakistan, which was utterly demoralized by that defeat.

In the Embassy, Farland stayed on during the war. Late in the war—it may have been over—Sid Sober had managed to fly back as far as Kabul, get a car down to the border and slip into Islamabad just in time for the war's end. As soon as the war was over, Farland felt he had to go back to the States on business, so he disappeared. He was back in the States for quite an extended period. Suddenly we heard that he had been named Ambassador to Iran. So he moved his personal entourage to Iran. He was there only a few months when Washington had to do something about Dick Helms, so they bumped Farland and sent him as Ambassador to Iran in Farland's place.

Q: How long were you in Pakistan when Bhutto was there?

INGRAHAM: Bhutto took over in January 1971. I left in the summer of 1974, so it was a couple of years. Most of this time, for two years—for reasons that to this day I am not quite sure of- -Sid Sober was Charg#. No ambassador was appointed. During the first few months, of course, Farland was the ostensible ambassador, but when he was appointed to Tehran in the late spring, nobody replaced Sid Sober. Sid remained chief of mission. Sid was the one who, with me at his shoulder, would frequently see Bhutto. Sid knew him better than anyone.

It was a fascinating time, because Pakistan was reforming itself as a totally different nation. All its perceptions had to be completely changed. It was no longer vital to India. It had one-eighth the population of India. Its army had been humiliated. Bangladesh was no longer part of Pakistan. The country began to look inward. Now, without Bangladesh, Pakistan actually became a sort of nation. They had four different ethnic groups, all of them bloodthirsty. But each could see that they had more in common with each other, with one exception, than any of them had with the outside.

I remember when I first arrived in Pakistan, back in the summer of 1971. I had never been there before. I knew India reasonably well, but I had no idea of what Pakistan was like. I remember the first weekend, my wife and I got into our car and drove down to Rawalpindi. We walked into our first Pakistani store and five minutes later I turned to Susan and said, “This is India.” It was the last time we ever said that, but we had discovered what Pakistan was—Pakistan is India. The culture is, shall we say, South Asian subcontinent. The Pakistani generals would have had nothing in common with, lets say, the generals of Iran. But those same Pakistani generals could talk for hours with their old classmates from military school who ran the Indian army. So Pakistan, in those days, anyway, was really India.

Q: How did we view Bhutto as far as his policy towards us?

INGRAHAM: During this period, quite favorably. When war broke out, Nixon said, “We don't want to be neutral, we want to tilt toward Pakistan.”

Q: It was Kissinger, I think.

INGRAHAM: We sent one of our aircraft carriers...

Q: Enterprise or one of those.

INGRAHAM: Yes. ...to the Indian Gulf. It had absolutely no effect on India because by that time the Indians had ended the fighting. We tried to claim that if it hadn't been for us the Indians would have kept right on going, but no such thing.

So with a favorable initial outlook from Washington, we considered Bhutto pretty good. He didn't do anything wrong during the period I was there. Later on he stole an election that he would have won honestly, anyway. That was one of his flaws: he couldn't be satisfied with 60 percent, had to have 90 percent. So his lieutenants went out and stole the election for him. That was the last straw for the army and he was overthrown.

Q: That was when?

INGRAHAM: That was about '75, '76. And then, of course, he was charged with murder. It was a trumped-up case. I suspect he ordered murders in his day, but then so had General Zia, who had him hanged. Bhutto was hanged as a common criminal And then there was that extraordinary period a decade later when his daughter became Prime Minister.

Q: You left Islamabad in...?

INGRAHAM: 1974.

Q: You came back for a period to Washington.

INGRAHAM: Three years. I was country director for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. It was a good job, but I was sorry to leave Pakistan because it had been so damn fascinating and you always had the feeling of being in on something.

Oh yes, just before I left, Byroade came in as Ambassador. So I didn't serve much under Byroade in Pakistan although I had served under him in Burma for two years. It took only a short time to realize he was going to get along fine with Bhutto. Byroade was determined to do the right thing by Pakistan. When he first came...that was when Moynihan was

in Delhi and Byroade was in Islamabad...Delhi was sending in some brilliant cables, drafted by the political section, no doubt, but it was obvious that Moynihan was editing a bit, spicing them up. As political counselor I had the job of trying to match Moynihan's prose. I would write what I thought was a sparkling rejoinder, saying, in effect, “Whatever Delhi may say, what really is happening is this.” I would send them in to Byroade. He would whittle them down, deleting all of my brilliant, sparkling phrases. I was furious at first but then I realized what he was doing. He would calculate, “We can't beat Moynihan in sparkling phrases, so we are going to go to the other extreme. We are going to tell Washington, 'Aw shucks, we can't write like that book-learnin' fellow over there in Delhi, but we have the honest, unvarnished truth to tell you from over here.'” So my cables would be butchered. But he knew what he was doing. We held our own, thanks to Byroade.

Q: When you were back in Washington for those three years wasn't it a relatively quite period for Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore?

INGRAHAM: There were only a few things going on. There was the East Timor business, which the outside world seized upon. A great deal of righteousness in that one. I was on the minority side. We found ourselves being hauled before Congress to testify.

Q: Could you explain what the issue was?

INGRAHAM: All right. In 1949 Indonesia replaced the Dutch East Indies with one small exception. Jakarta did not take over the eastern half of the small island of Timor, which was a Portuguese colony and had been one since the 16th century. The Dutch had chased the Portuguese out of most of East Asia, but they left them in the eastern part of Timor for some reason. For 300 years it was a decaying little Portuguese colony—not the island of Timor, just the eastern half. The people on both sides of the island were the same. They spoke the same language. The Indonesians put no pressure on the Portuguese. They were perfectly content. Even Sukarno was content to leave Timor alone. And after Sukarno, Suharto couldn't care less about East Timor. He felt the Portuguese

colony would sooner or later revert to Indonesia...it would have to because it was part of Indonesia. But there were more important things to do, so no pressure.

Then there was an upheaval in Portugal when everything was overturned and its empire fell apart. The echoes were felt in Timor. Three parties immediately sprang up. One was pro- Indonesian, one was “let us stay the way we are,” and the third and smallest was for independence. The independence party wasn't influenced by Lisbon, but, as far as I can tell, by Mozambique. Frelimo in Mozambique was a sort of mother party to the outfit called Fretilin—this is an acronym—in East Timor.

In short order in East Timor there was turmoil. Fighting among the three parties began. It was not particularly serious and was not encouraged by the Indonesians, who couldn't care less at that time. But then, the Portuguese colonial government suddenly and unexpectedly packed up and left. First it moved to an island off shore, apparently because it was getting sick of the low-level turmoil. Their attitude was, “We are going to lose the colony anyway, one way or another, so why should we lose any Portuguese lives.”

And at the same time the Portuguese garrison was pulled out. Now, the Portuguese garrison wasn't mainland Portuguese but Portuguese African mainly from Mozambique, and had been infected by the radical currents in Mozambique stirred up when the Portuguese pulled out. So when the garrison left, it turned over its arms to the left wing, pro-independence party in East Timor, which promptly, with those brand new guns, seized Dili, defeated the other parties and declared themselves independent.

The Indonesians suddenly woke up, saying, “We don't care about a Portuguese colony in the middle of Indonesia, but to have an assertive left-wing state....” The Indonesians are even more emotionally anti-communist than we were because of their 1965 experience...They said, “Well, this can't be” and very quickly they simply moved in. They moved in by force and they chased Fretilin out.

The majority of the East Timor people, did they want union with Indonesia? No. Did the majority of the people want independence under Fretilin? No. The majority of the people had a vague idea that they were part of a Portuguese colony but were totally outside the political dispute. The Portuguese, I think, claimed that they had about 30 percent of the population under “administrative control.” The rest were just living as they always had. It was a very poor island.

Unfortunately, there was a strange little sidelight on all this. In World War II, in 1942, when the Japanese were advancing down the Indonesian island chain, the Australians had sent a small garrison to try to hold on to East Timor. They hung on after the Japanese had taken the rest of the island chain all the way to New Guinea. The Japanese then landed in Timor...the Australian garrison was still there...and the Japanese really slaughtered the Timorese. The Australian garrison was pulled out, but the Japanese punished the Timorese badly. Because of this, the Australians have always had a guilty conscience about Timor. There was also a little group in Australia that kept up a close interest in Timor, including one Jimmy Dunn, who was something or other in the Australian government...librarian of the Parliamentary Library, I believe...and who started a drive to “Save Timor from the Indonesians.” When he came to the States, he testified before Congress and stirred up a lot of worldwide agitation. Also a number of the African countries lined up behind Fretilin, even though their leaders couldn't have located Timor on a map. A lot of countries went after Indonesia on this one. In fact a majority of the United Nations was against Indonesia. But we stuck with the Indonesians throughout the whole thing.

Q: Were you feeling pressure on the Desk?

INGRAHAM: Yes, we were feeling a great deal of pressure from Congress. But the State Department stayed solidly behind Indonesia. We said we were ostensibly neutral, we understood the Indonesian point of view and we would stand by Indonesia. I remember a meeting with Kissinger...A vote was coming up in the UN to condemn Indonesia and we

were planning to abstain. I remember somebody else and I went up to talk to Kissinger. We said, “We realize we are going to have to abstain, but the Indonesians have a real case here, and if there is any way that we could support them on this, because it is unfair”—we were really quite eloquent. And by God, when the vote came up and we went up to New York we were told to vote “no”, rather than abstain. All the Europeans abstained, everybody else voted yes and the United States and some of the Arab countries voted no. The Indonesians have always been grateful for that, because we actually stood up for them.

But it caused a lot of criticism. Even religion was dragged into it, unfortunately. The Timorese are basically Catholics on both sides of the island. Jimmy Dunn and the Australians, along with several congregations in the United States, were charging that Christians were being slaughtered by the Indonesians. The Indonesians had moved in rather smartly and had been more brutal than they had to be, although less brutal than they could have been. Partly because the people in Fretilin were not cynics but actually believed in their cause, they fought like tigers, didn't give up but retreated back into the hinterland. The hinterland was being decimated as the Indonesian army went in after them. Their fanatic resistance goaded the Indonesians into being rougher than they should have been.

So it was a very unhappy situation throughout. And the religious side of it... I can remember Jimmy Dunn testifying before Congress that it was not only ethnic genocide but religious warfare, with Christians being mistreated by the Indonesians. I had already testified, so I managed to slip a note to someone saying, “Point out that the Indonesian Minister of Defense is a Protestant and the Indonesian General in charge of the Timor operation is a Catholic. This is not a religious war.” Much of the propaganda to the outside world continued to be along those lines. It never has died out. To this day you can see periodic references in the papers to the atrocity of East Timor. It wasn't that, and it never has been. It was just a poor remote little community that got caught up in something that it wasn't prepared for and I don't know who you blame for this. The Australians were wrong,

but they believed it. The fanatics in the mountains, Fretilin, believed they were fighting for a greater future for mankind. The Indonesians were utterly convinced that they were simply taking back half an island right smack in the middle of their country that had been forcibly separated for centuries. The African countries felt they were trying to save their people from Asian terror. So it was a very sad situation.

Q: To move back to your last assignment overseas. You went back to Islamabad?

INGRAHAM: No. From Washington, I was assigned in '77 to Singapore as DCM.

Q: Okay, you were in Singapore how long?

INGRAHAM: From '77 to '79. I left prematurely.

Q: Who was ambassador in Singapore?

INGRAHAM: When I arrived, John Holdridge, an old, old friend.

Q: He is an Indonesian hand too, isn't he?

INGRAHAM: He is retired. He has been Ambassador to Indonesia and Assistant Secretary in EAP. He was the chief of mission in China before we had an ambassador. He was in China under George Bush at one time. He is a Chinese language officer.

Q: He was in the NSC.

INGRAHAM: John was a straightforward, hard working ambassador and a joy to work for. We had a nice little post going for us in Singapore. No big problems, but busy. We had lots of American businesses. They would have their headquarters in Singapore and operations throughout Southeast Asia.

Singaporeans were active on the world stage. Lee Kuan Yew loved being on that stage. They were also very sophisticated, very shrewd and they realized the future of Singapore

depended on their making Singapore recognized in this world. Otherwise, little by little, they would disappear into Malaysia or Indonesia unless they could establish a real Singapore personality. Which they did.

Q: How did you and the Embassy view Lee Kuan Yew?

INGRAHAM: We admired him greatly. You could talk to him. Lee was a very shrewd, smart person. He was quite enamored of his own intelligence, but in this case it was justified. He knew facts, relationships and was decisive making up his mind quickly. He was the boss. I remember people talking about an oppressive atmosphere in Singapore. Nonsense. It is the only country in all of Southeast Asia that has held free elections, and I mean really free elections, every four years from the very beginning. In between times Lee really rode herd on the country. But every four years everybody had a chance to say “in” or “out,” and they always said “in.” I can remember people saying the Singapore elections had to be dishonest because they have one oppositionist and some 70 government MPs. I would say, “This is a city government. It is like Chicago and the Daly machine that made the city run. This is the same sort of machine in Singapore, but honest.”

One thing about Lee Kuan Yew that most people didn't realize... I would stroll down Orchard Road, the main shopping street, walk into a jewelry store and there would be an elderly, pleasant man working behind the counter. I would chat with him...it was Lee Kuan Yew's father. If you wanted Chinese cooking lessons, you signed up with Lee Kuan Yew's mother. This was when he was Prime Minister of the country. Talk about squeaky clean honesty! It was in a way an ideal society, sort of a platonic society. They were engaged in all sorts of social engineering. For example, if every Singaporean lived in a separate house, the whole island would have been paved over. It was a beautiful green island with a huge forest reserve in the center, park land, open space everywhere. To preserve all this, they decided they had to go up. So they built high-rises. Right now more than 75 percent of the entire population lives in government-owned high-rise apartments. They

were taking Chinese out of little storefront shops, Malays out of Kampong, and putting them in high-rises. It was difficult but it was the best solution.

I remember talking to the Minister for Housing once, saying, “I am sorry to tell you this but in the '50s, '60s and even in the '40s we tried this same thing in New York—Stuyvesant Town, Peter Cooper Village, they started out fine but ended up disasters. You have to realize this.” He said, “Hell, I spent six years in New York studying those places. We know what the flaws were.” It is that kind of country.

Q: You left there in 1979.

INGRAHAM: Unexpectedly. Holdridge was transferred in the spring of '78. I was Charg# for about four months. Then in the late summer of '78 the new Ambassador came, appointed by Jimmy Carter. It was the sitting governor of South Dakota, Richard Kneip, who for reasons of South Dakota politics decided he wasn't going to run again. So he asked Washington for a job. He hadn't thought about ambassadorships. His wife once told me, “While we were offered various jobs in Washington [as a governor to another governor in a sense, although he always overplayed his intimacy with Carter] it seemed that we would have to have a very active social life and do a lot of entertaining if we took one of them, so we decided to take the job over here instead.” I gulped and thought, “Oh my God!” He was quite a disaster as ambassador. Happily, Singapore was not a country where we had any real troubles. The Singaporeans were sophisticated people, they understood why he was there. They were even a bit flattered that someone had asked to come to Singapore. We found ways of working around him.

I wrote an article on this for the Foreign Service Journal once. It started out rather early when his secretary came scuttling out of his office saying, “Hey, he just asked where Jakarta is!” The Ambassador's office in Singapore looks out over the Strait and the land visible in the distance is Indonesia. Very shortly, it turned out that he didn't know there were two different Koreas. One time he called me in and said, “Ed, I have these maps

here. This one says East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The other one says Pakistan and Bangladesh. Bangladesh? What happened Ed?" Questions like that. He had never heard of Chiang Kai-shek. He didn't know who Gandhi was—maybe he had heard the name somewhere. He had heard of Churchill but I don't think he knew of Attlee. This was a mind absolutely barren of any awareness of the entire outside world. Totally barren.

On his first call on Rajaratnam, the Foreign Minister, it became embarrassing because Rajaratnam would say, "Well, what about this?" The Ambassador would say, "Well..." and look at me and I would have to carry on. Then he would say, "Yes, that's right..." He was a man of a good deal of pride. He didn't like it. We got along in a rather rocky way. He hadn't the faintest idea what an ambassador did.

Apparently in South Dakota the perks of the governor are extraordinary—a summer palace, etc. I was the one who had to keep going in and saying, "Dick, I am sorry, you can't do it this way." I would try to find ways around it...then he would suspect I was undermining him...but I was just trying to keep him out of trouble.

For example, he wanted another secretary to handle his private affairs. Well you can't have a government secretary in the Foreign Service following his insurance policies, writing his checks, and handling his personal affairs. I had to find a way of getting around that.

Also he never entertained, just as in South Dakota, I guess. He had a large, lovely embassy residence (which those idiots in FBO are now going to tear down and put up apartments). Holdridge would entertain there probably five nights a week and sometimes breakfast as well. And the Embassy residence was a sort of center of activity for the American community, much of the business community. It was always there for the Singaporeans as well. Kneip simply closed it off. He had six of his eight children with him. They moved in and spent every night apparently watching movies, I don't know. He just never entertained. I had to do all of the entertaining. Fortunately we had a lovely house

there as well, with a separate suite so anyone who came from Washington to Singapore would always stay with me. I was in the strange position of running the Embassy more or less behind Kneip's back.

I remember the day when Billy Graham, the evangelist, came to Singapore. He asked for a briefing at the Embassy. Kneip didn't like it, being a Catholic. Graham came to the Embassy and Kneip was quite disgruntled. Graham started asking questions of Kneip and Kneip very sourly said, “Ask him, he knows it all.” I was surprised by Billy Graham, incidentally. He asked very sensible questions. And he said, “What I really want to know about is local sensitivities and what I shouldn't do. What our policies are now. I don't want to get in your way and cause any trouble. I want to make the best impression I can for my cause.” He was much more perceptive than I had expected. Kneip sat there frowning while Graham and I carried on the conversation.

Time and again, Rajaratnam or one of the people at the Foreign Ministry would get me aside at a cocktail party and say, “Well, what about thus and so?” Kneip was no dummy and he was aware of this. I tried; I think even he tried, but it just didn't work out.

He also had rather strange working habits. He would come in in the morning and would go home at noon for lunch. Sometimes he would come back in the afternoon and sometime he wouldn't. Part of it, I suppose, was frustration, because he couldn't figure out what to do. He would read the cables, but they were all from places with names like Kathmandu, and he didn't want to admit that he didn't know whether Kathmandu was a city or a country. His pride was being badly pushed around. So finally, he just snapped and bounced me out.

So I came back to Washington. The State Department was in a state of some embarrassment about the whole thing. They looked around for a job for me and sent me off as Diplomat-in-Residence at Lake Forest College. A very nice little liberal arts college just outside of Chicago where I spent a year.

While I was there I was brooding about the whole Kneip episode so I wrote an article for the Foreign Service Journal. I used pseudonyms, I called him Ambassador X.

Q: I recall when it came out. Everybody knew who you were talking about.

INGRAHAM: I guess I was naive, but I really didn't think they would. I thought some people in State would, and I hoped it would get up to the 7th floor. The article came out in the Journal and the first thing that I knew...whoever covers the State Department beat for one of the networks...George Gedda, I believe, was on the phone to me in Lake Forest. “Ed Ingraham, did you write that article?” I said, “What, what, what article are you talking about?” I should have said, “Of course I didn't write that article.” I didn't deny it quite strongly enough. The next thing I knew it was on the front page of the Chicago Tribune and all over the country. A sort of nine- day wonder. After that, I thought, things being what they are...Dick Holbrooke, the Assistant Secretary, was furious about the whole business because it made him look bad. He was very, very angry indeed at me. Higher up, somebody was on my side—I think it was David Newsom, who was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs at that time. So were a lot of the professionals in the State Department. Officially, the White House was most embarrassed. Without even being told, I realized this was the time to retire. So I came back to Washington after a very pleasant year at Lake Forest, spent the summer on home leave and retired in August 1980.

Q: Now we all know not to write articles. It was an excellent article, I might add. That came out when in case someone wants to look at it?

INGRAHAM: It came out in the Foreign Service Journal, the February 1980 issue.

Q: Well, I want to thank you very much.

End of interview